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ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES OF SUSTAINABLE
MULTI-USE FISHERIES MANAGEMENT
Keith R. Criddle

ABSTRACT

Economic prescriptions for the sustainable management of fisheries have typically been
framed in the context of commercial fisheries. Fishery management failures have been
characterized as a consequence of disjointedness between individually rational decisions and
globally sensible outcomes-the "tragedy of the commons". The solutions proposed by
economists flow from the insight that rational self-interest can lead to socially beneficial
outcomes when ownership is secure and prices reflect the opportunity cost of resource use.
Theoretical and empirical analyses have demonstrated that sole ownership, individual quotas,
territorial use rights, fishing cooperatives, and common property management regimes can
promote biologically and economically sustainable fisheries. Nevertheless, implementation of
these "solutions" has met with resistance, due in part to the impossibility of uncoupling species
within ecological systems and conflict between the proposed solutions and broadly accepted
concepts of social justice. The problem of devising a sustainable management strategy is
exacerbated in fisheries with diverse consumptive and non-consumptive users. An empirically
based simulation-optimization model is used to characterize the biological and economic effects
of alternative management regimes in a fishery with commercial and sport fishers. The results
are generalized to the case of additional use and nonuse values.
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ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES OF SUSTAINABLE
MULTI-USE FISHERIES MANAGEMENT

Introduction
Sustainable fisheries management means different things to different people. From a narrowly
single-species biological perspective, sustainable management of fisheries reduces to the
adoption of regulatory measures designed to ensure that the probability of stock or recruitment
levels falling below specific critical values does not exceed an acceptable risk level. Charles
(200 1) proposes comprehensive perspective that incorporates ecological, socioeconomic,
community, and institutional sustainability concepts. In this chapter, sustainable fisheries
management will be characterized as practices intended to ensure that the expected flows of use,
option, and nonuse benefits provided by the fishery are not degraded through time. l Use benefits
include the value of commercial, recreational, subsistence and other cultural harvests, the value
associated with observing fish in situ, the harvest value of trophically related species, and the
value of ecosystem services contributed by a sustainable fishery. Option value reflects the value
of preserving the opportunity to use a fishery resource at some future time as well as the value of
preserving the opportunity to use any other resource that is dependent on the sustainable fishery
(Bishop 1982; Freeman 1984). Nonuse benefits are those obtained by vicarious consumers of the
resource: benefits derived from knowledge of the existence of a fishery resource; value
associated with bequesting a sustainable fishery resource to future generations; the altruistic
value of preserving a fishery for other unrelated users; and, the value associated with the belief
that a sustainable fishery contributes to a desirable state of the ecosystem (Brown and Goldstein
1984; Miller 1981; Miller and Lad 1984; Walsh et al. 1984).
The fundamental problems faced by fishery managers are that nature cannot satisfy all of the use
and nonuse demands and, in most jurisdictions, fish are unowned until they are reduced to
possession. Because the benefits associated with use and nonuse of fishery resources accrue to
different people, the distribution of benefits cannot be dismissed in a narrow focus on the
magnitude of those benefits. When considering the sustainable management of fisheries,
managers are first and foremost faced with the question of which set of benefits to maximize and
consequently, the question of who will benefit from the fishery. For example, management
strategies that support commercial or recreational use benefits imply a concomitant reduction in
the magnitude of nonuse benefits. Allocations between user groups are typically determined
through a political process. Secondary allocations of use benefits are typically based on firstcome-first-serve ownership by capture (derby) rules. Because nonuse benefits are largely
nonrivalrous, they are less likely to engender inefficiencies in the secondary allocation.

I This defInition is similar to that proposed in NRC (1999a), where sustainable fIshing is defIned as "fIshing
activities that do not cause or lead to undesirable changes in biological and economic productivity, biological
diversity, or ecosystem structure and functioning from one human generation to the next; sustainable fIshing does
not lead to ecological changes that foreclose options for future generations". The difference is that the defInition
adopted in this chapter characterizes the value of ecosystem services as nonuse economic benefits and formally
recognizes the stochastic nature of the time stream of benefIts.
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When allocations take place through the operation of political processes, every action advantages
one sector relative to another. The preponderance of evidence from fisheries suggests that
allocations between commercial, recreational, and vicarious users are unlikely to be definitively
settled by a,ny single allocation decision. Instead, these allocation battles are reprised whenever a
set of stakeholders believes that their negotiating position has improved. Even in the fortuitous
circumstance that an initial allocation is optimal, changes in exvessel price, factor costs, stock
abundance, recreation trip costs, angler success, willingness to pay for nonuse benefits, etc., will
render that allocation suboptimal in subsequent periods unless a self-correcting mechanism is
provided.
The problem of fisheries management has often been characterized as a consequence of
disjointedness between individually rational decisions and globally sensible outcomes. The
economic approach to sustainable resource management flows from the insight that rational selfinterest can lead to socially beneficial outcomes when ownership is secure and prices reflect the
opportunity cost of resource use. The challenge for economic theorists and policy analysts arises
from the incompleteness of ownership and the failure of markets to fully reflect opportunity
costs. 2 These problems arise from when the rights to a resource are nonexclusive or when the
exercise of those rights is nonrival (Randall 1983).
Honore (1961) identifies attributes that characterize comprehensiveness of property rights: the
right to possession-the right to exclusive physical control of the thing owned; the right to
usufruct-the right to enjoyment and use of the thing owned; the right to manage-the right to
decide how and who gets to use the thing owned; the right to income-the right to compensation
for foregoing use of the thing owned; the right to capital-the rights to consume, waste, modify,
or destroy the thing owned; the right to security-the right to rely on the police powers of the
state to defend against expropriation; the right to alienate-the right to bequest, sell, or otherwise
dispose of the thing owned; the absence of term-the right to infinite durability of ownership;
the prohibition of harmful use-the duty to forebear from harming others with the thing owned;
the liability to execution-the thing owned can be used as collateral and taken as repayment for
debt; and the residuary character-the right to determine succession of ownership. In practice,
property rights to resources are attenuated to varying degrees along each of these dimensions.
The potential attenuation of property rights along a continuous gradation in each of these
dimensions creates an infinite degree of variability in the attributes of ownership and leads to
confusion when terms are incautiously used to describe broad ill-defined categories of property.
The terms "common property" and "public goods" are notorious in this respect.
In the United States and many other nations, the legal definition of property rights is based on
Roman law. In brief, Roman law recognized things that belonged to someone (rez in patrimonio)
and things that were outside private ownership but could be acquired (rez extra patrimonium).
The rights attached to the latter category depended on specific characteristics. Roads, harbors,
and rivers were classified as public property (rez publicae). Public edifices were identified as
2 It is important to differentiate between the role that fishery scientists play in predicting the likely outcome of
alternative management actions and their advocacy for particular policies or outcomes. The goal of developing
sustainable fisheries is a normative choice. The prediction that a particular management regime is unlikely to result
in sustainability is a positive assessment and should not be assumed to represent a normative preference for that
outcome.
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institutional property (rez institutiones). Water, shorelines, fish, and wildlife were identified as
common property (rez communes). Things that were incapable of ownership, had been
abandoned, or had not yet been acquired by private interests were defined as unowned property
(rez nullius). Common property and unowned property could be transfonned into private
property through capture (occupatio) or accretion (accesio). Thus fish in the wild are unowned
but become private property when reduced to possession. (For additional detail see e.g., Adams
1993.)
These categories of property are represented in Figure 1 in tenns of the extent to which nonowners are or can be excluded from using the property and in tenns of the degree to which use
by one person detracts from the amount or quality of resource available for use by others.
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Figure I.-Categories of property ownership and types of goods.
Activities related to fisheries differ in exclusivity and rivalry. The owner of a private stocked
pond has exclusive harvest rights and if she chooses to exercise those rights to take and consume
a fish, the act of eating that fish is strictly rivalrous. An individual who sport fishes on a public
stream is prohibited from excluding others from sportfishing on that stream. Ifhe retains his
catch, his activity is rivalrous. Ifhe releases his catch, his fishing is nonrivalrous, but his
presence on the stream may contribute to congestion. Benefits derived by individuals from
knowledge of the continued existence of fish stock are nonrivalrous and nonexclusive. The
"tragedy of the commons" (Hardin 1968) arises when resource use is rivalrous, access is
nonexclusive, ownership is established by capture, and the individual benefits of resource use
exceed the capture costs.
Because the beneficiaries of public goods are a large and diverse group, none of whom expects
to capture exclusive benefits from any expenditure that they incur to provide the public good,
many of those who benefit from the provision of the public good will freeride, gaining benefit in
excess of their willingness to pay for actions that preserve or enhance the public good (Calabresi
1968). Consequently, individual consumers have an incentive to understate their willingness to
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pay for goods that they cannot be excluded from enjoying and markets will provide suboptimal
levels of public goods (Samuelson 1954).
There are two basic solutions to externalities and freerider problems: the adoption and
enforcement of regulations and standards; or, design and adoption of more complete rights.
Regulations are attempts to prevent undesirable but rational responses by fishers to the perverse
incentives created by nonexclusive rights to rivalrous goods (NRC 1999b). Rights-based systems
rely on the definition of more comprehensive rights in order to change the incentives presented
to fishers.
Commercial and recreational fisheries have traditionally been managed under command and
control systems consisting of regulations and standards that stipulate minimum or maximum
size, open and closed seasons (days), maximum target and bycatch retention limits, sex, and
permissible gear. For example, the Bristol Bay, Alaska salmon fishery is subject to maximum
vessel length standards (32 feet), minimum gillnet mesh size standards (4 inches), limitations on
the total number of participants (limited entry), and restrictions on fishing locations and times.
Similarly, trout anglers may be subject to allowable gear standards (e.g., artificial flies only),
retention limits (2 fish per day, 4 fish in possession), and slot size standards (e.g., a prohibition
on the retention offish under 14 inches or over 24 inches). The efficacy of command and control
actions depends on the extent to which fishers can substitute unconstrained inputs or avoid being
detected in violation of standards or regulations. Command and control systems may also include
the use of fines, fees, taxes, or subsidies to induce fishers to internalize the negative or positive
externalities associated with their actions. For example, the Vessel Incentive Program in the
Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands groundfish trawl fishery was intended to induce avoidance of
chinook bycatch by assessing a fine for each chinook caught. Similarly, recreational user fees
reduce the extent to which recreators freeride on the cost of maintaining recreational areas.
Instead of arbitrarily specifying taxes, fees, subsidies, etc. in an effort to cause fishers to
internalize the costs and benefits of their actions, the rights bundle could be more completely
specified. Rights-based approaches involve the definition and enforcement of rights such that
externalities and the opportunity to freeride are reduced. When the rights bundle is well
specified, individuals have an incentive to defend the value of their property through negotiation
and civil action (Coase 1960; Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Libecap 1989).
A Brief Review of the Development of Economic
Thought About the Management of Fisheries
The underlying cause of problems in open-access fisheries has been attributed to incompletely
specified property rights. Although theoretical and empirical analyses have demonstrated that
sole ownership, individual quotas, territorial use rights, fishing cooperatives, and common
property management regimes can promote biologically and economically sustainable fisheries,
the focus of such analyses has been on the provision of use and option benefits and consequently
may not address the sustainability of nonuse benefits.
Although Gordon (1953; 1954) and Scott (1955) established the economic benefits of sole
ownership vis a vis open access, the special legal character of fishery resources has been has
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been found to restrict the conditions under which exclusive use rights can be conveyed to
individuals. The special legal attributes of fishery resources arise in part from what is commonly
referred to as the Public Trust Doctrine. 3 The Public Trust Doctrine is a portion of common law,
derived from Roman civil law, which provides that certain waters, the lands beneath those
waters, and the living resources within those waters are held in trust by the state for the benefit of
citizens. One of the earliest applications of the Public Trust Doctrine argued before the U.S.
Supreme Court was Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. (1892). The court found that
title to public trust lands is:

(( ... different from the title the United States holds in the public lands which are open to
pre-emption and sale. It is a title held in trust for the people of the States that they may
enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have liberty of
fishing therein freed from the obstruction or interference ofprivate parties.
The State can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are
interested, like navigable waters and the soils under them, so as to leave them entirely
under the use and control ofprivate parties than it can abdicate its police powers in the
administration ofgovernment and the preservation of the peace. "
Because public trust resources are held on behalf of the citizens, the State may be precluded from
transferring comprehensive ownership rights to individuals. In general, conveyance of public
trust resources to private ownership does not terminate the public's right of access or the State's
responsibility for stewardship. Consequently, when a usufructuary right to harvest fishery
resources is conveyed to individuals, the State continues to have responsibility for safeguarding
the sustainability of those resources. The Endangered Species Act (ESA), the Magnuson-Stevens
Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSFCMA), and international treaties reinforce the
stewardship responsibilities implicit in the Public Trust Doctrine.
Because sole ownership is not legally viable or politically feasible, resource economists sought
alternatives that might achieve comparable benefits. Christy and Scott (1965) and Gulland and
Robinson (1973) suggested that binding input restrictions could potentially achieve efficiency
gains comparable to those expected under sole-ownership. Several limited entry programs were
implemented in the 1970's. However, wherever unrestricted substitute inputs existed, and
unrestricted substitute inputs invariably existed, input limitation per se failed to control the race
for fish and ensuing dissipation of resource rents . Evaluations of the outcome of limited entry
programs can be found in inter alia Rettig and Ginter (1978), Adasiak (1979), Fraser (1979),
Meany (1979), Pearse and Wilen (1979), and Wilen (1979). Despite the many documented
examples of the inefficacity of input limitations, commercial fishery managers continue to
implement input limitation programs. One recent example is the Individual Transferable Pot
Quota (ITPQ) for spiny lobster (SAFMC 1992). While ITPQs place a limit on the number of
units of fishing gear, they leave open the possibility of capital stuffing in unconstrained input
factors and fail to address the externalities associated with gear conflict or stock depletion.

3 McCay (1998) provides an extensive discussion of the application of the Public Trust Doctrine to US fisheries.
Macinko (1993) examines the relationship between the Public Trust Doctrine and IFQs.
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The failure of input control programs led economists to suggest output controls in the form of
individual quotas (Moloney and Pearse 1979; Pearse 1980; Morey 1980). The MSFCMA defines
individual fishing quotas (IFQs) as limited access permits to harvest quantities of fish. Thus IFQs
convey an exclusive usufruct to decide when and how to use the quota shares, but do not extend
to ownership of the resource itself or the authority to decide how much of the resource can be
harvested in aggregate. These latter remain the trust responsibility of the state. IFQs are best
suited to fisheries managed by setting a Total Allowable Catch (TAC). Indeed, IFQs are
commonly expressed as shares of the TAC, so that the annual realization of the IFQ fluctuates
with variations in the level of the TAC. The TAC is usually determined on an annual basis by
applying a target exploitation rate to an estimate of the current stock size. Determining the target
exploitation rate and measuring the stock size are both subj ect to considerable uncertainty
because of large variability in the relationship between stock size and subsequent recruitment
and to general difficulty of accurately counting and measuring fish in the wild. Wilen (1985) and
Scott (1988), among others, argue that harvest rights are secure, cheating is precluded, and there
are no unique spatial or temporal concentrations that could lead to a race for fish, usufructuary
rights will induce IFQ holders to behave in a manner analogous to a sole owner. Other authors
(e.g. Johnson and Libecap 1982; Keen 1983) argue that more comprehensive rights, including
the authority to independently determine harvest levels, are a necessary condition for economic
efficiency.
Several IFQ programs were implemented during the 1980's and 1990's, including three in the
U.S.: mid-Atlantic Surf Clam-Ocean Quahog (MAFMC 1990); South Atlantic Wreckfish
(SAFMC 1992); and, North Pacific Halibut-Sablefish (NPFMC 1991). Evidence from the three
U.S. IFQ fisheries suggests that IFQs have increased net revenues for the harvesters and
integrated harvester-processors that were initial recipients of the IFQ, consolidated the number of
active harvest platforms, and distributed landings over longer seasons (Gauvin et al. 1994; Casey
et al. 1995; Wang 1995; NRC 1999b; Herrmann 1996,2000). Evidence with respect to quota
busting, highgrading, and bycatch is mixed (NRC 1999b). In addition, stock and production
externalities have not been eliminated (Boyce 1992), wealth and opportunity of other
stakeholders, e.g. processors, may have been reduced (Matulich et al. 1999; Matulich and Sever
1999), and rent-seeking associated with acquisition and defense of the IFQ may have dissipated
much of the windfall gain associated with the initial distribution.
According to the conventional argument, adopting an IFQ will increase economic efficiency,
improve conservation and stewardship, and improve safety. It is argued that excess harvesting
and processing capacity leads to temporally compressed seasons, reduced exvessel prices,
elevated harvesting costs, and consequently drives the expected value of net revenues to zero.
Accordingly, the introduction of an IFQ program is expected to lead to increased exvessel prices
(due to improved product handling and improved product flow to market) and cost savings (due
to the discontinuation of the high-cost fishing practices followed under open access). Figure (2)
depicts the effects of cost savings and a price increase.
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Figure 2.-The effect of an increase in exvessel price and reduction in harvest costs associated
with implentation of an IFQ. Thin lines reflect conditions prior to the price increase and cost
decrease.
In the absence of exclusive harvest rights, effort is expected to expand until the costs faced by

the last entrant equal their expected average revenues, an outcome depicted in the first panel of
Figure (3) as the intersection between the exvessel demand and average cost curves and
corresponding to the intersection of the total revenue and total cost curves in the second panel of
Figure (3). In contrast, a sole-owner would equate marginal revenue with marginal cost, thereby
maximizing net revenues.
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Figure 3.-The effect of an increase in exvessel price and reduction in harvest costs associated
with implentation of an IFQ. Thin lines reflect conditions prior to the price increase and cost
decrease.
In this example, open access results in a sustainable yield of about 72 million pounds at an

exvessel price of US$1.42 per pound, average costs equal to US$1.42 per pound landed, and zero
net revenues. The sole owner would harvest a sustainable yield of about 42 million pounds at an
exvessel price of US$2.21 per pound and earn net revenues of about US$72 million. The
magnitude of net revenues gained by IFQ holders depends on the extent to which they
collectively mirror the behavior of a sole owner.
Gear loss and gear conflict are commonly reported problems in temporally compressed fisheries.
In addition, the ownership-by-capture rule discourages individual fishers from taking
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conservation actions that could increase future catches but would reduce their current individual
catch because they cannot be assured of benefiting from those increased future catches.
Moreover under open access, other fishers would simply increase their current period catch to
take advantage of any leftover TAC. Under IFQs, there is greater flexibility in selecting fishing
time and area, with the possibility of reduced bycatch and greater product recovery. In addition,
IFQ fishers may set (and lose) less gear, thereby reducing ghost fishing and damage that lost gear
may cause to the marine environment. Consequently, IFQs are likely to reduce some of the
stewardship problems that arise under open access. However, because IFQs are usufructuary
rights to a share of the common resource and not rights to particular fish, shareholders have no
assurance that others will refrain from practices that are contrary to the overall maximization of
sustainable benefits and may conserve at less than the socially optimal level, especially when
shareholders are numerous and heterogeneous (Ostrom 1990; Ostrom et al. 1994; Criddle and
Macinko 2000). In addition, if the initial allocation of IFQs is through a political process, much
of the potential net benefits of the IFQs could be dissipated in a race for quota shares (Kruger
1984; Anderson and Hill 1990; Criddle 1994).
Territorial Use Rights in Fisheries (TURFs) are spatially based individual or collective harvest
privileges (Christy 1982; Seijo 1993). They are a special case of spatial harvest restrictions and
have often been applied in less industrialized and smaller-scale coastal fisheries where
management has been based on restricting participation to a localized population in a limited
geographical area. Examples of TURFs include nearshore fisheries in Japan (Ruddle 1989) and
Norway (Jentoft and Mikalsen 1994). Similar rights have been documented for fisheries in South
America (Cordell and McKean 1992; Gonzalez, 1996), the Caribbean (Berkes 1987), Asia Minor
(Berkes 1986), the South Pacific (Goodenough 1951; 1963; Johannes 1978; Carrier 1987; Lieber
1994), and in North America (Higgs 1982; McEvoy 1986; Bay-Hansen 1991; Newell 1993;
Agnello and Donnelley 1975; McCay 1998; Acheson 1988).
Under a secure TURF management structure with durable and transferable rights, harvesters will
select efficient levels of capital investment, and if the rates of larval dispersion and adult
migration between areas are low, they will internalize the benefits of stock conservation (Criddle
et al. 2001). However, it may be rational for TURF leaseholders to deplete the target stock if the
stock has low productivity or if there is a high level of uncertainty about future stock abundance,
price, or costs. Moreover, if the boundaries of the TURF are porous, that is, if it is difficult to
control the number of participants, or if there is significant larval dispersion or adult migration,
there will be an increased incentive to deplete the stock.
Commercial fishing cooperatives (Co-Ops) have recently emerged in fisheries off the Pacific
Northwest and Alaska. Like IFQs, the Co-Op shares are use privileges that permit the
shareholders to decide when and how to exercise their shares, but do not include ownership of
the resource itself or the authority to select aggregate harvest levels above limits set by the State.
Co-Op members rely on civil law to enforce contracts that partition the Co-Op' s share of the
T AC. Co-Op formation depends on the existence of a closed class of similarly situated and
motivated fishers and on an assessment by the Justice Department that the formation of the CoOp is not a prima fascia violation of statutory prohibitions on anti-competitive behavior (Larkin
and Sylvia 1999). Co-Ops are, effectively, sole-owners of a fixed percentage of the TAC and,
through negotiated contract, partition that ownership among the Co-Op members. Initial
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assessment of the outcomes of pollock Co-Ops in the Bering Sea suggests that product recovery
rates have increased, that the mix of products has shifted to include a greater percentage of
higher valued product forms, that product prices have increased, and that increased flexibility in
harvesting and processing are thought to present opportunities for cost savings (NPFMC 2001).
F elthoven (2001) demonstrates that the technical efficiency and capacity utilization of actively
operated catcher-processors has increased under the Co-Ops when compared for the same vessels
or firms in the years immediately preceding Co-Op formation. In comparison to IFQs, Co-Ops
offer the potential advantage of smaller numbers and greater homogeneity among shareholders,
thereby reducing transactions, monitoring, and enforcement costs (Olson 1965; Ostrom 1990;
Ostrom et al. 1994). Consequently, Criddle and Macinko (2000) argue that Co-Ops are likely to
generate greater aggregate net revenues and fewer stock externalities than IFQs. Townsend
(1995; 1997) explores the hypothetical characteristics ofa corporate approach to fisheries
management similar to the North Pacific fishing Co-Ops.
While limited entry and IFQs, and to a lesser degree TURFs and Co-Ops, have attracted most of
the attention of economists focused on commercial fisheries, it is important to note that
numerous fisheries have been or continue to be managed as traditional commons without
engendering a pathological race for fish. For example, most TURFs are based on custom and
tradition and lack formal legal standing. The allocation of grazing resources in the western US
during the late 1800s's (Anderson and Hill 1975; Dennen 1976) was based on a similarly extralegal foundation. Although the establishment of mineral and water claims in the western US
during the late 1800's lacked a basis in US law, it was recognized and enforced in the mining
camps and eventually codified as the Mining Law of 1872 and the doctrine of prior appropriation
that governs water allocation in most of the western US. The decision to allocate a resource as a
private or collective good is a matter of public choice. The consequences of the decision depend
on the interplay between the intrinsic characteristics of the good (Figure 1) and the institutions
created to support the allocation. Olson (1965), Ostrom (1990), Stevenson (1991), and Ostrom et
al. (1994) develop theoretical conditions under which collective action may be preferred to
private action. McCay and Acheson (1987), Berkes (1989), and Bromley (1992) include case
studies of fishery and other resources that have been successfully managed as common property.
However, when resource use is rivalrous, current resource appropriators are numerous, additional
appropriators cannot be denied access, current and potential appropriators are heterogeneous,
monitoring and enforcement is difficult, the commons devolves into open access, dissipating
economic value an increasing the likelihood of overexploitation.
Thus far, the discussion has focused narrowly on the use benefits that accrue to commercial and
artisinal fishers with no attention to changes in the welfare (consumer surplus) of those who
purchase fish from the harvesters, no attention to the provision of sportfishing and related use
values, and no discussion of the provision of nonuse values. In general, management regimes
that reduce the quantity of fish harvested also reduce the magnitude of consumer surplus.
Consequently, to the extent that IFQs, TURFs, Co-Ops, etc., successfully mimic sole ownership,
they simultaneously reduce consumer surplus. The consequences of a tradeoff between harvester
net revenue and consumer surplus will be explored in the theoretical model and empirical
example developed below.
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Although the model also includes a measure of the net economic benefits of sportfishing, it does
not address the question of how the magnitude of sportfishing net benefits varies under
alternative management regimes. Most North American sport fisheries are regulated open access
resources; the number of entrants is unconstrained, but there are regulations to limit the choice of
fishing technology and daily catch and possession. In a small number of sport fisheries, the total
catch may be restricted with annual catch limits (e.g., no more than 5 king salmon per year from
streams on Alaska's Kenai Peninsula) or lotteries for a limited number of fishing-days on a
particular stream system. In addition, some private firms use price to allocate sportfishing
opportunities in put-and-take ponds. While most North American sport fisheries operate under
some form of regulated open access, there are examples of rights-based sport fisheries in Europe
and IFQs are being considered for the charter-based halibut sport fishery in Alaska. Private sport
fisheries can exist in Europe because wild animals in situ were the property of the Crown rather
than the people and in certain locations the Crown transferred durable ownership of fish and
wildlife resources to private individuals. Consequently, private sportfishing clubs exist on many
stream reaches in Europe where they hold comprehensive rights including the right to
possession, the right to use, the right to manage, the right to compensation for damage to the
resource, the right to consume the resource and the right to transfer ownership to others When
the U.S. gained independence from Great Britain, the Crown's claim to fish and wildlife
resources as well as the derivative claims of Crown grantees were disallowed and fish and
wildlife became property of the citizens as a whole. The proposed implementation of an IFQ for
charter-based halibut fishing has been motivated primarily as a pragmatic approach to
depoliticize the allocation between sport and commercial fishers. The economic consequences of
transforming a sport fishery from regulated open access to TURFs, IFQs, or another rights-based
management regime are not yet well understood and the legality of such privatizations of public
trust resources has not yet been established.
The provision of nonuse benefits is problematic because such benefits are usually assumed to be
nonrival and nonexclusive. That is, one person's enjoyment of nonuse benefits does not affect
the supply of nonuse benefits available for the enjoyment of others and, it is difficult to exclude
individuals from obtaining nonuse benefits. The consequence of these features is that
individuals' demand for nonuse benefits will be under-represented in market transactions.
Unfortunately, the same factors that lead individuals to under-represent their value for nonuse
benefits in market transactions lead them to over-represent their value for nonuse benefits when
the cost of providing the benefits are shared with others. When the State retains stewardship
responsibility for the resource, interested parties can lobby for management actions that are
expected to increase nonuse benefits. Rights-based management regimes could be designed to
allow interested parties to acquire harvest rights in an initial allocation or through subsequent
transfer. Because limited entry programs do not convey a right to catch shares, acquisition and
nonuse of limited entry rights is not likely to generate increased nonuse benefits. Although IFQs
and Co-Ops entitle holders to shares of the TAC and thus unfished shares represent actual
reductions to annual catch, any biomass carried over from one year to the next would simply
increase the magnitude of quota shares for all shareholders in the ensuing year. Unfished TURFs
are de facto aquatic reserves. Consequently for species with low migration rates, TURFs may
offer greater potential for generating long term increases in nonuse benefits than other
management regimes.
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Maximizing Sustainable Net Benefits
The objective of sustainable fisheries management can be characterized as a constrained
maximization of the net present benefits associated with the flow of use, option, and nonuse
benefits over time:
T

Maximize NB =

2: (( J~r Y(NBu,.,NBoption,NBnonuse) J.

(1)

t=to

subject to Xt = Ix (Xt-k ,Xt-k, Yt-k ) - ht -1 ,
where Xt is the current biomass of the i -th age-class of the target species, Xt-k is the lagged
biomass of the target species, Xt-k is a vector of the lagged biomass of species that are related
to the target species through trophic or bycatch relationships in t - k , and Yt-k is a vector of
lagged environmental factors that influence stock dynamics. Target species biomass is assumed
to be an increasing (at a decreasing rate) function of the previous year's biomass, a decreasing
function of past harvests, and influenced by current and lagged environmental conditions and the
current and lagged abundance of other species through trophic or bycatch relationships. That is,
2
a Xt

0
-a->
'-2-<
Xt-1
ax
aXt

0

t-1

an

d aXt

~h
u 1-1

0

<,

while

could be positive or negative depending on the particular combination of variables and lags.
The discount rate r reflects societal time preferences. Net use benefits (NBuse) in period (t)
include the benefits associated with commercial, recreational, subsistence, and other uses of the
fishery resource:
NBuse =

I ( NBcommerciaf ,NBsport ,NBsubsistence, NBother ) .

Because net option benefits ( NBoption ) can be motivated as the present value of securing an
option to derive net use benefits at some future time, they can be subsumed in the time stream of
expected net use benefits. Net nonuse benefits (NBnonuse ) in period t are related to the
magnitude of present and future stock biomass:
NBnonuse =

I

(Xt+k ).
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Limiting the solution to equation (1) to those cases where the expected stock is time invariant
satisfies the requirement of biological sustainability. The additional requirement that the
expected flow of net benefits not degrade through time, suggests that the solution to equation (1)
must be subj ect to the constraint
dNB >0.
dt

-

This constraint is satisfied if net benefits are constant through time and the discount rate is set to
zero (r == 0) or if the rate of increase of net benefits through time equals the social rate of
discount. One characteristic of the optimal solution is that resources will be shifted among use
and nonuse activities until marginal net benefits are equal across all activities.
Before proceeding to explore the properties of a specific application of this model, it is important
to acknowledge some of the difficulties and limitations to this approach. Equation (1) assumes
that all net benefits can be reified, estimated, and expressed in a dollar metric, and that it is
meaningful to sum the suite of net benefits. In fact, nonuse benefits and some use benefits do not
lend themselves to quantification, are difficult to estimate, and are not easily expressed in
monetary terms. Moreover, a simple summation of net benefits may not reflect social preferences
with respect to the mix of benefits provided or their distribution. A complaint often levied
against models similar to equation (1) is that future generations are not expressly represented.
This concern about intergeneration equity applies particularly to the case of exhaustible
resources and irreversible investments. The concern about intergeneration equity does not apply
for sustainably managed fishery resources except to the extent that it may take time to move
from one particular sustainable allocation to another. If changes in social preferences could be
predicted through time, it would be possible to arbitrage the transition from a currently preferred
sustainable combination of use and nonuse benefits to a future preferred solution, thereby
ensuring an optimal sustainable solution across generations. Perhaps the greatest limitation to the
model developed in equation (1) is that uncertainty has been omitted. Figure 4 repeats the second
panel in figures 2 and 3, but includes random draws from the distribution of the conditional
residuals associated with the estimated price, cost, and fish popUlation dynamic relationships.
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Figure 4.-Variablility in total revenues, total costs, and net revenues when prices, costs, and
fish population dynamics are stochastic. In the first panel, total revenues are represented by
diamonds and total costs are represented by circles.
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Neglect of uncertainty may lead to undue confidence in the choice of optimal sustainable harvest
levels and allocations. Moreover, because society is unlikely to be neutral to the risks associated
with uncertainty, the optimal sustainable solution when stock dynamics and economics benefits
are stochastic fishery is likely to differ from the optimal solution when there is no uncertainty.
There are three principle sources of uncertainty. First, the form of structural relationships
governing the creation of net benefits and stock dynamics are unknown and may depend on
unobservable causal factors. Second, structural relationships may change over time. Third, even
when the structures of functional relationships are known stationary processes, there is error in
the observation of outcomes. Standard stochastic simulation-optimization techniques can be used
to address uncertainty associated with the estimation of structural relationships. Criddle and
Havenner (1991) develop an approximation approach that addresses the problem of model
specification. The solution of an optimal control problem similar to equation (1), but with
approximate structural relationships, is presented in Criddle (1993). Addressing the uncertainty
associated with nonstationarities in the structural relationships is particularly challenging. If the
nature of possible changes is predictable, conditional stochastic simulations (see e.g., Criddle et
al. 1998) can be used to address the problem of nonstationary structural relationships.
Uncertainty associated with changes in the behavior of structural relationships cannot be
modeled if the character of such changes cannot be anticipated. Management strategies
developed without consideration of uncertainty are unlikely to be optimal and are likely to be
infeasible (see e.g., Criddle 1996; Criddle and Streletski 2000) when model structure is unknown
or when observation of the structural relationships is subject to error. Nevertheless, for didactic
simplicity, the model developed below will assume that structural relationships are known, timeinvariant, and observed with certainty.
A Simulation-Optimization Model of the
Commercial and Sport Fisheries for
Pacific Halibut in the North Pacific
The general results derived above can be demonstrated in an empirically based model of the
commercial and sport fisheries for Pacific halibut (Hippoglossus stenolepis) in the North Pacific.
For simplicity, the model will ignore age-class structure and interactions among species. In
addition, the model only considers net use benefits associated with commercial and recreational
fishing. The representations of commercial and sport fishery bioeconomics are based on Criddle
(1994) and Herrmann et al. (2001), respectively.
The net benefits of commercial and sportfishing can be defined as the sum of net revenues and
post-harvest surplus in the commercial fishery, and the net benefits of sportfishing:
(1')

where NBs is the net benefit of sportfishing and NBc the net benefit of commercial fishing. The
net benefit of commercial fishing is equal to the sum of commercial consumer's surplus (CSc )
and the difference between total commercial revenues (TRc ) and total commercial costs (TCc ).
Total commercial revenues are the product of exvessel price (PI) and the commercial harvest
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(he,t). If exvessel demand is represented by a simple linear price dependent relationship 4 and

average costs are modeled as a function of fishing effort5 , the exvessel market for halibut can be
represented by
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Figure 5.-Exvessel demand and supply of halibut.
where commercial consumer's surplus ( CSe ) is represented by the integral between the exvessel
demand curve and the market clearing price and commercial net revenues (TRe - TCe ) are
represented by the integral between the market clearing price and average cost.
The magnitude commercial net revenues can also be represented as the difference between total
commercial revenues and costs:
(2)
This relationship id depicted in Figure (6).
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Figure 6.--Commercial net revenues.
The sustainable yield (hsY,t) is represented as a simple polynomial ofbiomass 6 :

4

p,=a+b(hc" )=$3.301-$O.026(hc,,)

15

(3)

Consequently, the magnitude of the sustainable yield varies in relation to biomass.
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Figure 7.-Sustainable yields.
Equations (2) and (3) can be combined to identify total and net sustainable commercial revenues.
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Figure 8.-Commercial net revenues.
Because exvessel price is inversely related to the magnitude of commercial harvests, commercial
total revenues are maximized at harvest levels below hMSY. In addition, because search costs are
inversely related to biomass, commercial net revenues are maximized when biomass is above the
biomass that maximizes sustainable yields (XMSY ).
Because exvessel demand was modeled as a simple linear price dependent function of
commercial catches, the corresponding consumer's surplus can be represented as:
(4)

Criddle and Havenner (1991) motivate this simple representation as a formal approximation of latent dynamic
processes.
6
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That is, commercial consumer's surplus is a strictly increasing function of the level of
commercial harvests. Because the sustainable yield is maximized at intermediate levels of
biomass, commercial consumer's surplus is largest at xMSY

$125
r-.

,9
E
V7
CI)

2-

$125

$100

r-.

,9

$75

'§

$100
$75

$50

t5 $50

$25

2-

$0
20

0

40

60

$25
$0 ~. .- - - - - -. .~--~--~~
o 100 200 300 400 500 600 700

80

Sustainable Yield (million Ibs)

Biomass (million Ibs)

Figure 9.-Commercial consumer's surplus.
Commercial net revenues (equation 2) and commercial consumer's surplus (equation 4) combine
to form total commercial net benefits
(5)
Figure (10) depicts the relationship between total costs, total revenues, and net revenues as a
function of the magnitude of sustainable yields and the status halibut stocks.
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Figure 1O.-Consumer' s surplus, harvester net revenues, and total net benefits of commercial
fishing.
The association between commercial net benefits and biomass indicates that combined net
revenues and consumer's surplus is maximized at a lower level of biomass and correspondingly
higher sustainable yield that the maximization of commercial net revenues alone. That is, when
benefits to consumers are treated on an equal footing with benefits to harvesters, the optimal
harvest level differs from the level that would be optimal from the perspective of a sole-owner or
a group of quota shareholders who behave analogously.
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The net benefits of sportfishing are defined as the sum across individuals of the net benefits
received conditional to the decision to participate in the sportfishing activity. Herrmann et al.
(2001) use a random effects pro bit model to estimate the probability of taking a halibut
sportfishing trip based on trip attributes and demographic characteristics:
P(participationi)

= 'T/o + 'T/lPt + Wt T BWt + nt TAnt + Zt Tv,

(6)

where Pt is the price of taking a halibut sportfishing trip, nt and Wt are vectors catch by species,
number, and weight, and Zt are demographic characteristics used as proxies for unobservable
tastes and preferences that influence the probability of participation. Conditional individual
participation probabilities are aggregated into estimates of total demand using a simulation-based
sample enumeration method (BenAkiva and Lerman 1985) that takes into account differences in
demographic characteristics and variability in the number of days fished per year by developing
forecasts for each individual in the sample. Changes in the probability of individual participation
lead to shifts in the total demand for sportfishing trips and to changes in angler welfare.
If all factors except expected catch per trip are held constant, the relationship between changes in
expected catch and changes in participation is represented by:
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Figure 11.-Percentage change in the probability that the average sport fisher will participate as
a function of changes in expected halibut catch ..
Following Hanemann (1999), conditional estimates of angler welfare (NBs) are calculated from
the estimated participation rate model as the product of the weighted average compensating
variation per trip taken and the total number of angler-days spent fishing. The relationship
between sportfishing net benefits and percentage changes in expected angler success is
represented in Figure 12.
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Figure 12.-The effect of changes in expected halibut catch on the magnitude of total
compensating variation.
These percentage changes can be rescaled as changes in the expected number of trips taken as a
function of changes in the average catch per trip.
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Figure 13.--Changes in the number of sportfishing trips taken as a function of average catch per
trip.
The demand for sportfishing trips can also be mapped as a function of the number of trips taken:
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In this projection, sportfishing net benefits are the integral between angler demand and the
average cost function. This relationship can be proj ected into a space representing sportfishing
net benefits as a function of total sportfishing catches.

C~) = o[ hs ~ 1] = $19.872 [hs ~ 1]

NBs

(7)
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Figure 15.-Marginal sportfishing net benefits.
The associated total level of sportfishing net benefits is the integral of the marginal net benefits
NBs

= ¢In(hs + 1) = 17.6341n(hs + 1)

(8)

This relation ship can be represented graphically as:
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Figure 16.-Total angler surplus as a function of the sustainable yield.
Taken alone, the sportfishing model suggests that angler net benefits (NBs) will be maximized
under a maximum sustainable yield management strategy, but that the incremental net benefits
are very low for allocations greater than 20-30 million lbs.
The commercial and sport fishing models represented in equations (5) and (8) and Figures (10)
and (16) represent exclusive allocations to either sport or commercial fishing. The problem posed
in equation (1 ') involves equating marginal net benefits across sport and commercial fishing.
That is, the problem requires a simultaneous selection of a level of sustainable yield and an
allocation of that sustainable yield between sport and commercial fishers. The commercial and

20
sport fishing models developed in equations (5) and (8) can be combined to restate the
optimization model in equation (l):

The solution to this constrained optimization can be found by solving a related unconstrained
(Lagrangian) function formed by augmenting the objective with the constraine:

Setting the derivatives of this Lagrangian functions with respect to the control variables (he,t ,
hs ,t ) and Lagrange multipliers (At) equal to zero, yields a set of necessary conditions for an

optimum.
If w ==

X~2

and

z== (, 1 _1)2 + 4, 2ht, then Xt

= ( __1_]( ,

2,2

,

1 -1) ± (_l_]z~ and the marginal
2'"'12

net benefits of commercial fishing are:
(7)
Where

dx
dz

So,

7

See e.g. , Clark (1976, 1985); Bj0mdal (1988); Hannesson (1993).
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Thus the marginal net benefits of commercial fishing can be represented by:
dL _
[
(/31-1)
/31 dW]
dh - a + bhe - ca f31he
W + he dh
e
e

= a + bhe = a

+ bhe -

= a + bhe -

+A

car f31h~!lI-I)x!l, ± h!'!32x !l, -I) ((-'fl -1/ + 4"u( he + hs ) rY, ]+ A
C

caf31hi/3I-J)x/32

± cah?1f32 X(/3]-J) (( ' 1 _1)2 + 4,2 (he + hs ) )-X+ A .

1-1
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(
caf31hc"~/X/32 ±

cah/3lf3 X(f32-J)
e

2

~ ( , 1 _1)2 + 4,2 (he + hs )
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+A

The marginal net benefits of sport fishing are:
d L = d ¢ In (hs
dhs
dhs

+

1) +

A=

[_1_]
+
+

e

hs

A.

(8)

1

The total net benefits of commercial and sport fishing are maximized when the marginal net
benefits of commercial fishing are equated with the marginal net benefits of sportfishing:

(9)

The Lagrange multiplier A represents the marginal net benefit of an increase in the sustainable
yield associated
(10)
U sing equations (7) and (8) to allocate the sustainable yield between commercial and sport
fishers results in the sport and commercial catch levels depicted in Figure (17):
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Figure 17.---Optimal allocation of sustainable yield.
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The optimal allocation of the sustainable yield to commercial and sport fisheries depends on the
level of stock biomass. Because the marginal net benefits of sport fishing exceed the marginal
net benefits of commercial fishing at low sustainable yields, catch is first allocated to the sport
fishery. 8 As the quantity of fish allocated to the sort fishery increases, the marginal net benefit of
additional sport fish catches declines. When the marginal net benefit of sportfishing drops below
the marginal net benefit of commercial fishing, subsequent harvest shares are allocated to the
commercial fishery. The optimal total net benefits of commercial and sportfishing are
represented in Figure IS.
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Figure lS.-Net benefits of optimal allocations of sustainable yield. Thin lines in the second
panel represent sustainable yields at biomasses below XMSY' Thick lines in the second panel
represent sustainable yields at biomasses above XMSY.
At low biomass levels, the marginal net benefits of commercial fishing are so small that most of
the sustainable yield is allocated to the sport fishery. At intermediate levels of biomass, the
marginal net benefits of commercial fishing increase and an increasing large share of the
sustainable yield is allocated to the commercial fishery. At very high biomass levels, the
sustainable yield is small and it is optimal to allocate most of the sustainable yield to the sport
fishery. The sum of sport and commercial net benefits is maximized at a biomass of 443.5
million lbs. with catches of 44.9 million lbs allocated to the commercial fishery and lS.0 million
lbs allocated to the sport fishery (Tables 1 and 2). The relationship between the sustainable yield
and sport, commercial, and total net benefits is reflected in the second panel in Figure IS. The
upper arms of the total and commercial net benefit curves correspond to biomasses above XMSY.
The upper arm of the sportfishing net benefits curve corresponds to biomasses below XMSY.

8 It is important to acknowledge that this result is probably an artifact of the model specification. The data available
for estimating a sportfishing net benefits function did not allow for estimation of the relationship between average
trip costs and halibut population size. It is likely that the cost of catching a halibut increase as population size
declines. Consequently, the net benefits of sport fishing are probably overstated at low levels of biomass.
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The optimal allocation rule is perhaps easiest to recognize when the shares to sport and
commercial fishers are represented as percentages of the sustainable yield (Figure 19):
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Figure 19.--Optimal allocations of sustainable yield. Thin lines in the second panel represent
sustainable yields at biomasses below XMSY. Thick lines in the second panel represent
sustainable yields at biomasses above XMSY.
Figures 17 and 18 depict the optimal allocation of sustainable yields and the net benefits
associated with those yields. The overall optimal solution to equation (1" ') is to manage for a
biomass of 443.5 million lbs and to allocate 71 % the 62.9 million lbs sustainable yield to the
commercial fishery, with the balance allocated to sportfishing. The overall optimal is solution is
estimated to provide US$55.2 million in net revenue to commercial harvesters, US$26.2 million
in consumer surplus to the purchasers of commercial catches, and US$51.9 million in net
sportfishing benefits (Table 2). There are several reasons why the fishery might not be managed
for the overall optimal solution. In addition to the problems of model misspecification and
uncertainty described above, the presence (absence) and characteristics of rights-based
management programs will influence the likelihood that the overall optimal solution will emerge.
In addition, because the overall optimal solution is suboptimal with respect to the provision of
net benefits to different stakeholders. Consequently, the actual solution may closely reflect the
preferences of politically empowered stakeholders. Tables 1 and 2 characterize the distribution
of catch and benefits under a variety of management regimes. Value to the sport and commercial
fisheries is independently optimized in the solutions reported in Table 1 and jointly optimized in
the solutions reported in Table 2.
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Table I.-Characteristics of alternative management regimes independently optimized for
commercial or sport fishing.
Biomass (million lbs.)
Commercial catch (million lbs.)
Sport catch (million lbs.)
Price (US$)
Effort (million skates)
Commercial net revenue (US$ million)
Consumer's surplus (US$ million)
Commercial net benefits (US$ million)
Sport net benefits (US$ million)
Total net benefits (US$ million)

Open
Access
444.5
62.7
0
$1.12
0.167
0
$51.1
$51.1
0
$51.1

Max(SY)

Max(NRc)

Max(CSc)

Max(NBc)

Max(NBs)

326.1
72.3
0
$1.42
0.381
-$41.9
$67.8
$25.9
0
$25.9

536.5
42.2
0
$2.21
0.055
$72.0
$23.1
$95.1
0
$95.1

326.1
72.3
0
$1.42
0.381
-$41.9
$67.8
$25.9
0
$25.9

490
54.0
0
$1.90
0.100
$64.4
$37.9
$102.2
0
$102.2

326.1
0
72.3
0
0
0
0
$75.7
$75.7

The open access solution (Table 1) represents a fishery managed without consideration of
benefits to commercial consumers or sport fishers and where the commercial fishers are unable
to agree to behave like a sole owner. While the open access solution does not provide positive
net benefits to sport or commercial fishers, it provides substantial (US$5I.I million) net benefits
to the purchasers of commercially harvested fish. This result provides an explanation for why
processors often oppose the implementation of rights-based fishery management programs. In a
purely commercial fishery, maximization of sustainable yields generates US$67.8 million in net
benefits to fish purchasers and net operating losses of US$4I. 9 million for commercial fishers.
Consequently, it is extremely unlikely that commercial fishers would harvest the MSY. Net
sportfishing benefits are maximized when commercial fishing is disallowed and catches
approximate MSY. A sole owner of an exclusively commercial fishery would choose to harvest a
sustainable yield of 42.2 million lbs, earning US$72 million in net revenues and coincidentally
providing US$23.I million in net benefits to fish purchasers. If fishery managers were interested
in maximizing the total net benefits of commercial fishing, they would set the TAC equal to 54
million lbs and implement regulations to induce commercial harvesters to behave like a sole
owner. In so doing, the commercial fishery would generate total net benefits ofUS$102.2
million; US$64.4 million in net revenue for harvesters and US$37.9 million in net benefits for
fish consumers.
The solutions represented in Table 2 maximize net benefits to various stakeholders conditional
on the optimal allocation of sustainable yields between the commercial and sport fisheries.
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Table 2.-Characteristics of alternative management regimes jointly optimized for commercial
and sport fishing.
Biomass (million lbs.)
Commercial catch (million lbs.)
Sport catch (million lbs.)
Price (US$)
Effort (million skates)
Commercial net revenue (US$ million)
Consumer's surplus (US$ million)
Commercial net benefits (US$ million)
Sport net benefits (US$ million)
Total net benefits (US$ million)

Max(SY)

Max(NRc)

Max(CSc)

Max(NBc)

Max(NBs)

Max(NB)

326.1
37.1
35.2
$2.34
0.136
$34.9
$17.8
$52.8
$63.3
$116.1

512.1
37.4
11.4
$2.33
0.066
$61.9
$18.1
$80.0
$44.3
$124.3

422.5
45.3
20.6
$2.12
0.117
$51.7
$26.7
$78.4
$54.2
$132.6

474.5
42.7
14.6
$2.19
0.089
$59.5
$23.6
$83.1
$48.5
$131.6

192.3
8.9
51.2
$3.07
0.048
$9.2
$1.0
$10.2
$69.7
$80.0

443.5
44.9
18.0
$2.13
0.107
$55.2
$26.2
$81.4
$51.9
$133.3

The first thing to notice in Table 2 is that the overall optimal solution is inferior to all other
solutions from the perspective of at least one of the three stakeholders represented in the
optimization model. From the perspective of commercial fishers, the solutions that maximize
commercial net revenues, commercial net benefits, and even net benefits to fish consumers are
all preferred to the solution that maximizes overall net benefits. Similarly, sport fishers prefer
solutions that maximize net angler benefits, maximize sustainable yields, or maximize net
benefits for commercial consumers. Another important result presented in Table 2 is that
consideration of the joint benefits of commercial and sport fishing provides larger overall net
benefits than are generated when the goal of fishery management is solely motivated by an
interest in maximizing net benefits to commercial or sport fishers (Table 1). The results also
emphasize the importance of considering the benefits that accrue to those who purchase
commercial catches.
Although the solutions that maximize overall net benefits, maximize the net benefits for
purchasers of commercial catches, or maximize the net benefits of commercial fishing produce
similar levels of overall benefits, they involve quite different allocations between sport and
commercial fisheries. This suggests that even when the fishery is managed to maximize net
benefits across multiple stakeholders, there may be considerable flexibility in the choice of who
to favor in the allocation. That is, there are multiple nearly equally efficient solutions with
differing distributional consequences. Consequently, even if all of the stakeholders agree to abide
by a solution that maximized net benefits across uses, they will probably contest the allocation
decision.
If the demand for commercially harvested fish increases (decreases), the optimal solution can be
expected to allocate a larger (smaller) catch to the commercial fishery. Decreases (increases) in
the cost of commercial harvests can be expected to have similar effects. Increases in the cost of
travel to Alaska can be expected to reduce the net benefits of sportfishing, implying that
reallocating the sustainable yield in favor of the commercial fishery would maximize the overall
net benefits. Changes in population (of people) or average income influence the demand for
commercial catches and the demand for sportfishing opportunities and will have an
indeterminate effect on the magnitude of the optimal sustainable yield and the optimal allocation
of between sport and commercial fisheries. If sportfishing demand changes to favor an increased
level of catch-and-release fishing, the overall optimal solution can be expected to include
increased commercial catches. Changes in ocean productivity that affect the carrying capacity or
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the intrinsic population growth rate of halibut will also affect the optimal sustainable yield and
the optimal allocation of that sustainable yield.
Because changes in ocean productivity, changes in the demand or supply functions in the
commercial fishery, and changes in the willingness to pay and participation cost function in the
sport fishery affect the optimal sustainable yield and the optimal allocation of the optimal
sustainable yield, any initially optimal allocation will be suboptimal in subsequent periods.
Consequently, allocations would need to be revisited whenever the economic or biological
conditions change. Rather that address the between user-group allocation decision through
political processes, it might be possible to design a system of transferable harvest privileges or
territorial use rights that could shift the burdensome allocation battles from the management
arena into the market place.
Although the model developed in this section did not represent nonuse benefits or use benefits
such as subsistence harvests, it is possible to anticipate how the optimal solution would change if
such values had been modeled. Mathematically, the economics of subsistence fisheries resemble
sport fishery economics. The net benefits of subsistence fishing could be estimated using
contingent valuation techniques, perhaps developed in a willingness to be compensated
framework rather than a willingness to pay framework. The net benefits of subsistence fishing
are likely to be an increasing (at a decreasing rate) function of catch. Including a subsistence
fishery would involve a three-way allocation of the sustainable yields and probably suggest an
optimal solution closer to the maximum sustainable yield solution. If nonuse benefits were
assumed to be an increasing function of biomass, including nonuse benefits in the model would
shift the optimal solution towards higher levels of biomass with correspondingly lower
sustainable yields partitioned among the users.
Practical Opportunities and Limitations for
Maximizing Sustainable Net Benefits
Theoretical models and empirical evidence suggest that when compared to regulated open
access, rights-based management systems increase harvester net revenues, increase overall net
economic benefits, improve safety, and increase conservation and stewardship incentives. The
opportunity for increased harvester net revenues is greatest when the rights are transferable, that
less economically efficient fishers will find it advantageous to sell their quota shares or spatial
use rights to more efficient fishers. To the extent that stock conservation and stewardship
increase the capitalized value of quota shares, transferability encourages the most responsible
fishers to acquire additional spatial use rights or quota shares. If rights can be defined in a way
that is meaningful across use and nonuse values and to the extent that all use and nonuse values
can be fully captured, self-interest and transferability will encourage the movement of the quota
shares/spatial use rights to the use/nonuse that generates the greatest marginal net benefit,
ensuring the maximization of overall net benefits. The appeal of rights-based management
systems lies in their potential to channel rational self-interest in a way that coincidentally
maximizes overall net benefit. Because they exploit an alignment of individually rational actions
and socially optimal outcomes, rights-based management are potentially self-regulating.
Although theoretically possible, the knowledge and control needed to maximize overall net
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benefit through command and control systems is overwhelming and such systems have failed to
yield sustain overall net economic benefits or the resource base on which they depend.
With the apparent advantages of rights-based management systems, it seems reasonable to
wonder why IFQs, Co-Ops, and TURFs have not been warmly embraced and uniformly adopted.
The answer is that the creation and enforcement of rights is not costless (Anderson and Hill
1975; Dennen 1976). Because it can be costly to change the legal and social institutions that have
been developed to support current fishery management systems and because it can be costly to
monitor and enforce quota shares or spatial use rights, especially when there are numerous
rights-holders, rights-based management systems will be less prevalent than might otherwise be
anticipated. Moreover, the advantages of rights-based systems are reduced when the rights
cannot be defined in a way that allows meaningful transfer across categories of use and nonuse
stakeholders, when the opportunity to freeride on nonuse benefits cannot be eliminated, or when
the benefits (costs) of individual stewardship are not fully captured by the self-same individuals.
With the foregoing caveats in mind, the following section will speculate on the practical
opportunities for using economic incentives to ensure that the flow of use, option, and nonuse
benefits is not degraded through time.

Commercial Fisheries-Economic incentives can be designed to increase the internalization of
stock externalities in rights-based commercial fisheries. This could be accomplished by coupling
the rights-based approach with performance standard or through unbundling the set of rights
embodied in the quota share or spatial use right. Examples of the former include overlapping
fixed period leases with renewal based on performance, zero-revenue auctions with performance
standards reflected in the resale provisions, and combinations of fees, taxes, and subsidies based
on performance standards.
The design and performance of an overlapping lease system are described in Young and McCay
(1995). In brief, fixed period multi-year leases are granted to current fishers. Before the lease
period expires, fishers are offered an opportunity to switch to new fixed period leases that would
commence in the next time period and be operative for some time beyond the terminal year for
the current lease. The new lease could include stewardship requirements that are more stringent
that those required under the current lease. For example, the new lease might require reduced
bycatches of non-target species or the adoption of gear designed to have fewer undesirable
effects on benthic communities. Fishers who willingly shift to the new leases gain the advantage
of longer economic planning horizons.
Zero-revenue auctions (Hausaker 1992) are used to encourage the adoption of sulfur dioxide
emissions reducing technology in mid-west US power plants. Under the Clean Air Act Acid Rain
Program, approximately 3% of all emission rights sunset annually. Government auctions the
released rights, with all sales proceeds going to the individuals whose rights were attenuated.
NRC 1999b suggests that inclusion of similar provisions in a rights-based fishery could be used
ensure that at least a minimum volume of rights would be released to the market at regular
intervals and that the transactions would reveal information about the value of the rights. The
zero-revenue auction structure lends itself to modifications that could improve resource
stewardship. For example, organizations representing nonuse beneficiaries could acquire quota
shares or spatial use rights through competing in the auction. In a similar manner, the
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management agency could retire a portion of the attenuated rights, thereby reducing total catch,
and in the case of TURFs, creating Marine Protected Areas. This type of fractional reduction of
rights has been used in the Florida spiny lobster fishery to reduce fishing capacity (SAFMC
1992). It would also be possible for fishery managers to attach performance criteria to the rights
released through the zero-revenue auction. For example, exercise of the auctioned rights might
be subject to more stringent bycatch standards or gear restrictions. While differing from zerorevenue auctions in many respects, the annual contract negotiations related to community
development quotas (CDQs) in Alaska's groundfish fisheries suggest that a variety of social
objectives (e.g. employment and training opportunities) can be built into the auction fishing
rights (NRC 1998).
Overlapping leases and zero-revenue auctions use voluntary market transactions to influence
resource stewardship. It is also possible to use regulations, taxes, fees, and subsidies in
combination with rights-based management systems to encourage additional conservation and
stewardship. For example, the CDQ and Co-Op fisheries for walleye pollock (Theragra
chalcogramma) in the Bering Sea are subject to bycatch caps intended to minimize adverse
impacts on other directed fisheries. The CDQs and Co-Ops are also subject to time and area
closures intended to reduce the possibility that those fisheries could jeopardize recovery of
Steller sea lion (Eumetopias jubatus) populations. Taxes, fines, fees, and subsidies affect
harvester net revenues and consequently influence fishing activities. For example, the adoption
of measure to reduce seabird bycatch has been accelerated by the US Fish and Wildlife Service's
decision to subsidize the purchase of paired streamer lines. Fines for individuals who exceed
their quotashare or catch non-target species encourage fishers to avoid bycatch and overages.
Differential taxes or fees can be designed to affect the amount of bycatch taken and the types of
gear employed in the fishery.
Property rights represent a bundle of entitlements and obligations. It may be possible to
encourage conservation and stewardship by refining the scope and scale at which the rights are
defined and allowing transfer of fractional rights. For example, there is probably some price at
which halibut IFQ holders would agree to forgo the right to fish in a region of particular interest
to sport fishers. Because halibut quota shares are currently defined on a gross geographic scale, it
would be difficult to engineer such an agreement. However, if managers agreed to help monitor
and enforce voluntary small-scale spatial partitioning, for example by requiring vessel
transponders and releasing data on locations fished, it is possible that commercial fishers could
be induced to fish outside areas of interest to sport fishers. Note that in this example, the
commercial fishers did not transfer their quotashare, they transferred their right to fish their
quota share in a section of the management area. The Nature Conservancy and Ducks Unlimited
have actively employed similar fractional rights transfers to obtain conservation easements from
landholders. Similarly, if the bundled target-bycatch quotashares in the Bering Sea CDQ and CoOp fisheries were unbundled, halibut or crab fishers could encourage bycatch reductions in the
by purchasing the bycatch rights.
If rights can be defined on a natural spatial/temporal scale, a scale at which there is little overlap
(through migration etc.) with the rights of other holders, stock externalities will be minimized
and the value of good stewardship will be capitalized in the value of the quotashare or spatial use
right. Stock externalities can also be minimized if the number of shareholders fishing a given
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stock is small enough for the benefits of collective action to offset the private benefits of
reneging on the collective agreement.

Sport Fisheries-The large number and complex motivations of actual and potential participants
complicate the design of economic incentives to reduce stock and congestion externalities in
sport fisheries. Command-control systems including site-specific user fees, gear restrictions,
catch, and retention have the potential for constraining total removals and congestion, but they
do not ensure that net sport fishing benefits will be maximized or that there is an optimal
allocation among use categories or between use and nonuse of fishery resources. An option that
could be useful in some sport fisheries would be to adopt an annual lottery based allocation such
as that used for many big-game hunting opportunities. Because every applicant has an equal
probability of receiving a permit and because the number of permits is set to avoid
overexploitation of the stock, a lottery would be unlikely to conflict with interpretations of the
Public Trust doctrine. If lottery winners are permitted to auction their permits, individuals who
place the greatest value in sportfishing for a particular species at a specific location will be able
to obtain permits. Equity concerns are at least partially satisfied by the fact that every applicant
has an equal opportunity of being drawn and that permit sales are voluntary. By itself, a lotteryauction allocation does not address stock externalities as well as they might be addressed under
longer-term rights. However, it is difficult to imagine how long-term rights could be designed to
be consistent with current interpretation of the Public Trust doctrine.
The potential utility of economic incentives for encouraging sustainable sport fisheries is perhaps
greatest in the interface between sport fisheries and rights-based commercial fisheries. While
there are few such interfaces at this time, there are several fisheries where sport fishing is a
substantial component of fishing mortality and where the commercial sector could be organized
under a rights-based system. The proposed introduction of IFQs for halibut charter vessels in
Alaska and the possibility that quota shares may be transferable between the sport and
commercial fisheries has the potential to reduce allocation battles between commercial and a
large share of the sport fishery. Although it is difficult to imagine individual sport fishers or
charter operators acquiring enough quota shares to internalize the stock externality, it is not
inconceivable that groups of operators could collectively manage their quota shares to avoid
localized depletion problems.

Nonuse Beneficiaries-The challenge of eliminating the freerider problem is central to any
attempt to reflect nonuse values in the design of sustainable fisheries. While freeriders are an
important problem in the sport fishery, the set of participants provides a good indication of who
benefits from sportfishing. In the case of nonuse benefits, it may be impossible to identify the set
of beneficiaries let alone estimate the magnitude of net benefits that they would derive under
alternative fishery management strategies. Nevertheless, the freerider problem has not prevented
the Nature Conservancy or Ducks Unlimited from obtaining conservation easements or outright
ownership of lands that provide nonuse benefits to their memberships. Consequently, the
existence of freeriders may pose a lesser impediment to the expression of nonuse benefits than is
posed by the lack of property rights. Suppose for a moment that all nonuse beneficiaries could be
convinced to contribute their full willingness to pay into a fund dedicated to sustainable fisheries.
If the fishery is managed under regulated open access rules, the way to express the nonuse value
would be to engage in lobbying the management agency and any gains in nonuse benefits would
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be obtained as uncompensated losses to fishers. It would be as though Ducks Unlimited were
precluded from purchasing lands and conservation easements and reduced to buying
advertisements that encourage landowners to voluntarily adopt duck friendly farming practices.
While the advertisements might influence some landowners, it is likely that more could be
influenced if they were offered cash compensation. In a rights-based fishery it could be possible
for nonuse values to be reflected in the acquisition of spatial use rights or quotashares. As an
added consequence of owning fishing rights, the nonuse beneficiaries would face the opportunity
cost of leaving their rights unfished. When faced with those opportunity costs, it is not unlikely
that they would choose to exercise a portion of the fishing right. (See e.g. Baden and Stroup
1981)

Conclusion
The NRC review of sustainability in marine fisheries (NRC 1999a) concludes: "universal
application of conservative management on a single-species basis would go a long way toward
reducing overexploitation of the world's marine fisheries." Similarly, good management of
fisheries for use benefits would go a long way towards preserving the time stream of use, option,
and nonuse benefits. The GECD Committee for Fisheries (GECD 1997) concludes that:
"Experience has shown that a regime which does not adequately limit fishing capacity may lead
to overexploitation and poor economic performance. In addition, management regimes which
limit the total catch, or the number of fishing vessels, or which restrict the efficiency of the
harvesting sector, including technical measures and T ACs, have generally yielded poor results
when used in isolation i.e. without complementary measures." The suggested complementary
measures include limited entry permits, IFQs, TURFs, and community based management
systems. Hanna and Munasinghe (1995a, 1995b) conclude that property rights regimes can play
a crucial role in harnessing market forces to support sustainable resource use. In the conclusion
to his examination of sustainable fishery systems, Charles (2001) emphasizes the advantage of
rights-based self-regulatory institutions. He notes that rights-based management systems "help to
clarify the roles and responsibilities of the various players in the fishery, and thereby steer
incentives in the desired direction." However, he cautions that "an inappropriate rights system
can lead to undesired consequences, such as a loss of resilience in communities of institutions".
This chapter has little to add to the findings of previous studies; the key impediment to
sustainable use and option values is the lack of clearly articulated property rights. In commercial
fisheries, the ownership by capture rules lead harvesters to dissipate net revenues and encourages
uneconomic and biologically unsustainable harvest levels. In sport fisheries, the lack of effective
limits on the number of sport fishers and magnitude of sportfishing catches has led to substantial
reductions in the commercial TACs that may have reduced overall net benefits to society. When
political muscle is the basis for allocating T AC among commercial, sport, and subsistence users,
the resultant allocations cannot be expected to maximize overall net economic benefits. The key
impediments to the provision of nonuse benefits arise from their character as public goods and
the difficulty of eliminating opportunities for beneficiaries to freeride.
A necessary condition for fully harnessing the self-regulating power of markets to constrain
harvests and adjust the allocation fishery resources is the creation of meaningful and enforceable
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in situ rights. While it may not be possible to create an ideal set of rights, it should be possible to
improve on the status quo. IFQs, Co-Ops, and TURFs have been found to address many of the
economic inefficiencies that characterize traditional commercial fisheries. Broadening the
ownership criteria to allow other stakeholders the opportunity to acquire and own quota shares or
spatial use rights may be possible. For example, it is easy to imagine that a group of sport or
subsistence fishers or nonuse beneficiaries could ensure their interest in the fishery through
acquisition of TURFs: TURFs have been used to allocate harvest rights in some European sport
fisheries; TURF-like rights have been recognized for Native Americans in several US and
Canadian fisheries; and, TURFs are analogous to the land holdings and conservation easements
that the Nature Conservancy, Ducks Unlimited, and similar organizations have acquired to
secure use and nonuse benefits for their membership. Annual individual harvest rights are being
considered as a mechanism for allocating sportfishing opportunities in big game fisheries.
Permanent IFQs are being examined as a mechanism for addressing the allocation of halibut
TAC between commercial fishers and charter operators in Alaska. Because IFQs and Co-Op
shares are based on a percentage of the annual T AC, the potential nonuse benefits of acquiring
and holding quota shares generate a stock externality in favor of commercial, sport, and
subsistence fishers. Nevertheless, nonusers could potentially acquire enough quota shares to
influence overall stock levels for some species in some regions. While these solutions will not
eliminate all externalities or opportunities to freeride, they are likely to promote sustainability to
a greater degree than the status quo.
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ABSTRACT

Economic prescriptions for the sustainable management of fisheries have
typically been framed in the context of commercial fisheries. Fishery management
failures have been characterized as a consequence of disjointedness between individually
rational decisions and globally sensible outcomes-the "tragedy of the commons". The
solutions proposed by economists flow from the insight that rational self-interest can lead
to socially beneficial outcomes when ownership is secure and prices reflect the
opportunity cost of resource use. Theoretical and empirical analyses have demonstrated
that sole ownership, individual quotas, territorial use rights, fishing cooperatives, and
common property management regimes can promote biologically and economically
sustainable fisheries. Nevertheless, implementation of these "solutions" has met with
resistance, due in part to the impossibility of uncoupling species within ecological
systems and conflict between the proposed solutions and broadly accepted concepts of
social justice. The problem of devising a sustainable management strategy is exacerbated
in fisheries with diverse consumptive and non-consumptive users. An empirically based
simulation-optimization model is used to characterize the biological and economic effects
of alternative management regimes in a fishery with commercial and sport fishers. The
results are generalized to the case of additional use and nonuse values.

